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Abstract
The Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) produced by the Agence Franc¸aise
de De´veloppement (AFD) has been carried out in 2001, 2006 and 2009, and
a new wave is planned for 2012. Although the structure of the surveys varies
greatly between 2006 and 2009, the similarity of a substantial proportion
of the questions allows for exploring and exploiting the panel components
of the database. This paper presents some general patterns of short-term
institutional change, aided by a conceptual classification of the institutional
variables. It tests two hypotheses in a preliminary way: a) that institutions
tend to score higher over time, and b) that institutions tend to converge
across countries. Additionally, it explores associations between institutions
and growth for the period 2001-2009.
1 Introduction
The topic of institutional change has attracted a great deal of attention within
the neoinstitutional literature of the recent decades. Many facets of it have been
studied, such as the pace of institutional change (Krasner 1984; Tushman and Ro-
manelli 1985), its exogenous and endogenous determinants (e.g. Greif and Laitin
2004), and in particular how exactly processes of institutional change take place
∗Maastricht Graduate School of Governance - UNU-Merit. Email: luciana.cingolani@ maas-
trichtuniversity.nl
†Maastricht University School of Business and Economics. Email:
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and evolve over time (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March and Olsen 1989; North
1990, North 2006; North, Walllis and Weingast 2009).1
Entering fully into the complexities of this vast topic is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. Yet, the article aims to provide some empirical evidence regarding short-term
institutional change that may be illustrative enough to test some basic proposi-
tions. This opportunity is given by the original compilation of a three-wave panel
dataset from a subset of the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) produced by
the Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (AFD).2 The three waves correspond to
the years 2001, 2006 and 2009, although only a part of the survey questions were
kept similar enough to include them as panel variables, in a sample of 51 coun-
tries evenly distributed across world regions. The breadth of the IPD database
allows to explore short-term institutional change along a set of numerous and var-
ied institutions with a level of disaggregation that is not common to find in other
sources.
In section 2 we provide a methodological explanation of how the panel IPD database
was compiled and how the data contained was aggregated in order to construct in-
terpretable measures of institutional dimensions. Section 3 presents some general
descriptive statistics summerizing short-term institutional change, both for the
full sample and across regions. Section 4 puts to test some basic premises about
institutional change: whether institutions tend to improve over time and whether
they tend to converge. Section 5 presents time-series analyses of the associations
between institutions and growth. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data compilation
2.1 Compilation of three comparable waves
In order to spot the variables that were comparable in all three waves (2001, 2006,
2009), the 4-digit items of the original surveys were assessed3. Regarding this, a
total of 159 items were considered either identical or sufficiently similar for a total
of 51 countries4, out of the 376 items included in IPD 2009, and the 281 items of
1For an interesting review see Kingston and Caballero 2009.
2The IPD database can be downloaded from the websites of the AFD, Maastricht Graduate
School of Governance and CEPII.
3Retaining the 4-digit items as opposed to the 3 or 2 digit items was found preferable in order
to carry through a completely clean comparison across waves, and to better distinguish between
the conceptual categories that were later used for analysis.
4See Annex 7.1 and 7.2 for details on the countries and questions retained.
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IPD 2001 and 2006. Also, the items retained were rather balanced across the nine
functions and the four sectors of the original survey. The number given to each
comparable item listed in the Annex 7.2 is that corresponding to its equivalent of
the 2009 wave (i. e., although the 159 are comparable across waves, for the most
part their numbering changed from 2006 to 2009). As a result, we end up with a
balanced panel with three time periods, and a total of 153 observations.
2.2 Conceptual Aggregation
Once the panel dataset was configured, a first aggregation mechanism needed to be
decided upon in order to make the data manageable for the purpose of analyzing
general patterns and trends of institutional change in all countries of the sample.
There are, of course, several ways of aggregating IPD data, depending on the
nature of the analyses5. In the case of the panel structure for the three waves, it
was considered most useful to work with a conceptual aggregation of the items,
aiming to match as best as possible existing theoretical (and often also empirical)
classifications of institutional variables in the neoinstitutional scholarship.
In order to retain a manageable number of institutional variables out of the data,
each of the 4 digit items were classified into ten institutional dimensions and seven
policy areas. Some items serve to two dimensions (only rarely to three), as it can
be argued they are good proxies for either.
The ten institutional dimensions are: 1) Democracy and Civil Liberties; 2) Se-
curity and Order; 3) Power dispersion institutions; 4) Social Cohesion and Social
Dialogue; 5) Property Rights and Rule of Law; 6) Government Capacities; 7)
Transparency and Accountability; 8) Economic Openness; 9) Social Openness; 10)
State Intervention in the Economy. The seven policy areas are: 1) Social Pol-
icy; 2) Subsidies and Price Controls; 3) Intellectual Property Rights protection;
4) Defence of Competiton; 5) Financial and Banking Policy; 6) Labor Policy; 7)
Education and Training Policy. A brief explanation of each dimension will follow
in the next section.
There are several reasons for this aggregation. First, the categories are easily
interpretable and rather parsimonious. Second, the concepts follow to a certain
extent the conceptual guidelines behind the IPD survey structure. Third, the
aggregation is not wave-dependent (i. e. the interpretation of the aggregation
does not change in every wave, so it represents a stable comparison structure
for the past as well as forward looking). Fourth, this aggregation offers a better
opportunity to distinguish between fundamental institutions and policies. Finally,
5Examples of aggregations can be seen in de Crombrugghe and Farla 2011.
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it allows significant room for the interaction with other institutional databases, as
well as academic debate within the established scholarship.
The distinction between institutions and policies is common in economic studies of
institutions and growth. Its relevance lies, among other things, in the opportunity
of distinguishing between feasible and less feasible interventions in the public arena.
In general, what the literature recognizes as fundamental institutions tend to be
slow-moving, wide-encompassing rules of the game, whereas policies appear as
more malleable in the short-run (on this, see the differentiation made by Tommasi
and Acun˜a (2000) in their ”hierarchy of rules” classification).
3 Descriptive patterns of institutional change
In this section we present the data corresponding to the institutional measures
constructed for our sample of 51 countries in 2001, 2006 and 2009. We first present
summary statistics of all 10 institutions and 7 policy areas for the full sample. We
then place the focus only on the institutions, explaining their conceptual grounding
on theory and presenting a visual approximation to their short-term evolution
across world regions.
3.1 Institutional change across the world
Table 1 presents the mean values and the standard deviations (in parentheses)
of the 10 institutional dimensions extracted from the IPD panel database, in all
three waves. The scaling of each measure goes from 0 (denoting a lower level of
institutional maturity) to 4 (denoting the highest level)6. The dimension Inter-
vention in the Economy in reality measures to which extent the economy is free of
intervention, meaning that 4 involves low intervention levels.
6This scale is the same for the individual 4-digit items. Most items range from 1 to 4, except
those measuring whether a certain policy or condition is in place, in which case 0 is also allowed.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for 10 institutions
Institution 2001 2006 2009
Democracy and Civil Liberties 2.997 3.042 3.06
(.829) (.805) (.804)
Security and Order 2.98 3.101 3.067
(.577) (.539) (.562)
Dispersion of Power 2.253 2.5 2.478
(.764) (.707) (.721)
Social Cohesion and Social Dialogue 2.679 2.722 2.782
(.592) (.598) (.465)
Property Rights and Rule of Law 2.556 2.735 2.730
(.811) (.691) (.731)
Government Capacities 2.523 2.755 2.708
(.670) (.558) (.556)
Transparency and Accountability 2.518 2.722 2.774
(.728) (.670) (.643)
Economic Openness 2.626 2.728 2.756
(.647) (.595) (.569)
Social Openness 2.913 2.978 2.904
(.564) (.523) (.522)
Intervention in the Economy 2.814 2.877 2.913
(.730) (.664) (.582)
All institutions 2.686 2.816 2.817
(.603) (.535) (.531)
Table 2 presents the mean values and standard deviations for the 7 policy mea-
sures constructed out of the 4-digit items. Similarly to the previous institutional
dimensions, the scale ranges from 0 to 4, where 4 represts higher quality policies
(although in the case of policies the interpretation is less straightforward and there
is larger room for controversy about what is a better policy).7
7It is advisable to see the items included in each dimension (Annex 7.2) in order to help
interpreting the policy variables.
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Table 2: Summery statistics for 7 policy areas
Policy Area 2001 2006 2009
Social Policy 2.206 2.319 2.485
(.911) (.917) (.846)
Subsidies and Price Controls 2.732 2.81 2.752
(.835) (.878) (.861)
Intellectual Property Protection 2.216 2.289 2.284
(1.011) (1.04) (.972)
Defence of Competition 2.353 2.373 2.34
(.758) (.805) (.782)
Financial Policy 2.553 2.745 2.758
(.62) (.56) (.541)
Labor Policy 2.775 2.745 2.724
(.402) (.423) (.32)
Education and Training Policy 2.56 2.541 2.58
(.738) (.608) (.651)
All policies 2.485 2.546 2.56
(.605) (.597) (.587)
All policies (excluding financial policy) 2.474 2.513 2.527
(.627) (.628) (.615)
Overall, it is possible to observe some differences between the behaviour of policies
and institutions. Policies tend to have lower means and higher dispersions, a
pattern that appears consistent with the expectation that policies diverge more
across national settings. We also present averages for all policy areas excluding
financial policy, as the latter dimension presents a rather distinctive behaviour
compared to the other areas, with a higher mean value and a lower dispersion (the
only exception being labor policy).
Throughout the reminder of the article the focus is put exclusively on the analysis
of the 10 institutional variables.
3.2 Institutional change across regions
The summary statistics for each institution are informative of very general patterns
of short-term institutional behaviour. It is, however, more interesting to show the
variance of this evolution in the different world regions: 1) Asia and Pacific; 2)
Western Europe and the United States; 3) Central and Eastern Europe; 4) Latin
6
America and the Caribbean; 5) Middle East and North Africa; and 6) Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of Democracy and Civil Liberties. This dimension
includes items measuring the level of electoral competition, as well as the extension
of the basic liberties of citizens within a country’s borders, such as freedom of
assembly and demonstration, freedom of the press and freedom of movement.
There exists no unanimity in the definition of democracy. The concept has evolved
over time, as the historical events unfolded in different regions of the world. Col-
lier and Levitsky (1997) note that the concept has gone through much innovation,
which to some extent led to the phenomenon of concept stretching (including too
many cases under a concept without relaxing its definition). Munck and Verkuilen
(2002) provide an extensive review of how democracy and democratization scholars
have dealt with three methodological challenges: the conceptualization, the mea-
surement and the aggregation of democracy. These authors stress that most of
the definitions have remained procedural, meaning that no socio-economic welfare
requirements are included.
The construction chosen here selects the two dimensions of free and fair elections
and civil liberties. These two can be grounded on the idea of contestation, one
of the two dimensions of a polyarchy, as famously conceptualized by Robert Dahl
(1971).8 In this context, contestation involves free and fair elections, freedom of
organization, freedom of expression and pluralism of the media. The work of Dahl
has had a profound impact in the democratization literature, and his theoreti-
cal foundations were subsequently used in the operationalization of the concept
(Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado 2008). Overall similar dimensions have been
used by other authors: contestation of executive and legistlative offices (Alvarez,
Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski 1996); political liberties and popular sovereignty
(Bollen 1980); competitiveness of participation and executive recruitment (Mar-
shall and Jaggers 2001); elections and political freedoms (Hadenius 1992).
This dimension is in line with the first institutional function of the IPD survey
on political institutions, which involves public rights and freedoms, as well as
legality and legitimacy levels (de Crombrugghe et. al. 2010). This dimension,
however, includes civil freedoms related to access to information and freedom of
movement.
8A polyarchy is a political regime that allows public opposition and establishes the right
to participate in politics (Coppedge and Reinicke 1990 p. 51). Apart from contestation, a
second persistent dimension of a polyarchy is inclusiveness, understood as the degree to which
the population is entitled to participate in politics and compete for power. No clear items of
inclusiveness were detected in the panel IPD. However, this dimension has become somewhat
obsolete, as it refers mostly to universal suffrage.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Democracy and Civil Liberties per Region
Changes in this dimension happen rather slowly over time. Countries are highly
clustered in Western Europe, somewhat clustered in Eastern Europe, Latin Amer-
ica and Sub-Saharan Africa, and rather disperse in Asia and the Pacific and the
Middle East and North Africa.
Figure 2 presents the evolution of Security and Order. This dimension is of rather
straightforward interpretation, and it includes items measuring the level of conflict
and violence within a country, as well as the power of the state to maintain over-
all stability. It measures to which extent security is threatened by underground
organizations and organized criminal activity, as well as military tensions with
other countries. This dimension preserves the essence of the second institutional
function of the IPD survey Safety, law and order, control of violence (de Crom-
brugghe et. al. 2010) but includes items on freedom of movement for nationals
and foreigners.
In this case, the dispersion within regions is more similar than in the case of
Democracy and Civil Liberties, and changes happen faster in time. It is possible to
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observe an overall downward trend in Western Europe, and the opposite situation
in Eastern Europe, whereas patterns of change are less clear in the other four
regions.
Figure 2: Evolution of Security and Order per Region
Figure 3 presents the values of distribution of power institutions. This category
refers to the distribution of power within a polity, both vertically and horizon-
tally. Vertical distribution of power is the extent to which power is allocated to
sub-national and local polities within a country (a typical example would be to
distinguish between unitary and federal governmental structures). Horizontal dis-
tribution of power refers to the way in which power is allocated between and within
branches: the executive, the legislative and the judiciary.
There is a rather vast literature on the idea of dispersion of power institutions,
ranging from debates on presidential versus parliamentary regimes (Linz 1990,
Shugart and Carey 1992, Sartori 1997) to more comprehensive frameworks such as
the work on veto players and veto points (Tsebelis 1995). In all cases, the matter
9
under scrutiny is how many relevant decisional players exist within a polity and
to which extent policies are delegated to different governmental levels.
Although this dimension is of promising value for analysis, it is worth mention-
ing that after compiling the panel dataset, items belonging to only two aspects
remained: decentralization levels, and judiciary and central bank independence.
Ideally, this dimension should be nourished with data on parliamentary and cabi-
net composition, party system characteristics, etc.
When assessing regional regularities, it is somewhat striking to see that the de-
veloping world scores much lower on this dimension than in others (democracy,
for example). This can be observed in the boxes corresponding to Latin America,
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, where Israel stands as
an outlier.
Figure 3: Evolution of Dispersion of Power Institutions per Region
Figure 4 shows the short-term evolution of social dialogue and social cohesion mea-
sures. This dimension gathers items informative of the level of social segregation,
10
market segmentation due to ethnicity, gender or religion, levels of social protest
and the existence of institutionalized dialogue channels between workers and firms.
There is an overall upward trend for the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, but there are less clear patterns in the other regions.
Figure 4: Evolution of Social Cohesion and Social Dialogue per Region
Figure 5 shows the short-term evolution of property rights and rule of law. This
dimension gathers items that grant information on the security of private property,
the quality of private and public contracting institutions, the level of expropriation
compensation, and overall judicial guarantees against state action. The idea of
property rights as a fundamental institutional dimension has encountered several
and prominent proponents (North, 1990; Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson 2001;
Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009).
It is interesting to note the rather low but stable values for the Middle East and
North Africa, in contrast to the highly fluctuating values of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Also on this dimension there is an overall upward trend for Central and Eastern
11
Europe, although with higher dispersion than in other dimensions.
Figure 5: Evolution of Property Rights and Rule of Law per Region
Figure 6 presents data on government capacities. This dimension mainly refers
to the capacity of the government to implement its desired policies. It includes
items assessing the level of governmental planning, as well as its steering and reg-
ulatory capacity. Geddes (1996) defines state capacity as the capacity to translate
preferences into actions, which in turn depends on effective bureaucratic organi-
zations (pp. 14). This concept relates to some extent to the literature on state
autonomy (Skocpol 1979; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985), as it assigns
preferences for the state as something somewhat differentiated from other sectors
of the society. Yet, the works on state capacity evolved in order to conceive the
state as a non-monolitic actor, with overlapping and often contradicting incentive
structures among its players. In this dimension both Western and Eastern Europe
show greater variance than in other dimensions. The former presents an overall
downward trend, which contrasts with Eastern Europe as well as the Middle East
and North Africa. Asia and Pacific presents more dramatic fluctuations in this
12
category than the other regions.
Figure 6: Evolution of Government Capacities per Region
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the transparency and accountability dimension
across regions. This dimension gathers items relating to the availability of in-
formation regarding sensitive and relevant public issues, the level of large and
small-scale corruption and the oversight power of both governmental and societal
institutions. In this context, it reveals the level of transparency in governmental
accounts, the quality of official communications, the quality of accounting systems
in the private sector, the existence and power of supervisory bodies, among others.
This dimension cuts across different sectors of the economy.
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Figure 7: Evolution of Transparency and Accountability per Region
Figure 8 presents time-series plots regarding the degree of openness of the economy.
This dimension mainly refers to two factors: the level of market competition and
the degree of market internationalization. It includes information on differences
between local and international standards in different sectors of the economy, the
degree to which markets are managed by few and traditional players, the easiness
for foreign capital to establish in the country, among others.
Countries appear highly clustered in Western Europe, Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa and quite dispersed in the other regions. On this dimension, very
few countries score lower than 2: China, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Zimbabwe
in 2001, and Iran, Syria and Vietnam in all three periods. In general terms, the
mean values for this variable increase over time.
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Figure 8: Evolution of Economic Openness per Region
Figure 9 shows the short-term evolution of social openness. This dimension seeks
to reveal the level of segregation in society, the willingness to accept changes, the
importance of personal ties for mobility and overall social equality. Items here
range from the society’s responsiveness to change in different areas, to freedoms
to access information; gender, ethnic and religious segregation, and the role of
family in finding a job. Along with Democracy and Civil Liberties, this is a rather
slow-moving institution. Countries in all regions tend to be more clustered than
in other dimensions.
15
Figure 9: Evolution of Social Openness per Region
Finally, figure 10 presents data on the level of governmental intervention in the
economy, understood as the implementation of measures that alter market prices,
such as the introduction of subsidies and price controls. Although it partially
overlaps with the dimension of economic openness, it is a more specific variable
that captures short-term fluctuations and does not necessarily inform about the
overall internationalization or competitiveness of the economy. It is worth noting
that although the title for the dimension is intervention, a higher score means less
intervention.
On this dimension, countries present rather dispersed measures within regions,
and substantial short-term fluctuations. It is of no surprise that this institution
behaves more in line with the short-term change in policies.
16
Figure 10: Evolution of Intervention in the Economy per Region
4 Institutional Change: convergence and improve-
ment?
The data presented in Table 1 suggests that some patterns are present in the short-
term evolution of the 10 institutional dimensions. First, the standard deviation of
each institution tends to decrease from one wave to the next. Secondly, it can be
observed that the mean values for 9 out of the 10 dimensions increase over time, in
particular when comparing 2001 to 2006/2009. This section explores the extent to
which these preliminary findings can be further substantiated statistically.
In order to better visualize the short-term evolution of the dispersion in institu-
tional scores, Figure 11 presents a time-series plot of the standard deviations of all
institutions, showing an overall downward trend. The dimensions Democracy and
Civil Liberties and Security and Order show the least convergence, whereas Social
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Cohesion, Property Rights and Intervention in the Economy show the strongest
convergence. A one-sided comparison of means test assessing the statistical sig-
nificance of the difference in means between the 2001 wave and the remaining two
gives a p-value of 0.0431. This value can be interpreted as rejecting the hypoth-
esis that the difference between the means of 2001 and those of 2006 and 2009
(as one group) is zero or positive (at the 5% significance level). Thus, the idea
of short-term institutional convergence finds some support in the evidence gath-
ered here. The p-values corresponding to comparisons between either 2001 and
2009 alone, or 2006 against any of the other two do not meet the same statistical
significance.
Figure 11: Short Term Evolution of Institutional Dispersion
In order to assess the second preliminary finding suggesting that institutional
quality has increased between 2001 and 2009, we propose to test the model:
Ik,i,j = γk + αi + β1D2006 + β2D2009 + uk,i,j (1)
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Where Ik,i,j is the institutional level (ranging from 0 to 4) for k institutional
dimensions, i countries and j waves; γk are the fixed effects of the 10 institutions;
αi are the fixed effects for the 51 countries; D2006 is a dummy for the year 2006,
and D2009 is a dummy for the year 2009; and uk,i,j is the error term. This leaves
a total of 1530 observations.
Table 3 presents the results. Dummies for most of the institutional variables are
significant, having democracy as baseline for comparison. The results also show
a coefficient of 0.13 points for the year 2006 dummy and 0.132 for 2009. These
results are significant at the 1% level. The coefficients and standard errors remain
similar after including fixed effects.
These estimations suggest that improvements in the institutional scores over the
years are statistically significant. The reader should be warned, however, about
the fact that IPD data is collected from surveys that measure perceptions on
the reality, which might be influenced by expectations of change, more than real
change. The effects of real and perceived change cannot be distinguished here,
although it can be expected that perception biases have a rather erratic behavior,
not consistent with the pattern uncover here.
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Table 3: Institutional change: time effects.
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Security 0.017 –
(0.042)
Dispersion of Power -0.622∗∗ –
(0.042)
Cohesion -0.305∗∗ –
(0.042)
Property Rights -0.359∗∗ –
(0.042)
Capacities -0.371∗∗ –
(0.042)
Transparency -0.362∗∗ –
(0.042)
Economic Openness -0.329∗∗ –
(0.042)
Social Openness -0.101∗ –
(0.042)
Intervention -0.164∗∗ –
(0.042)
Year 2009 0.132∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.023) (0.026)
Year 2006 0.130∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.023) (0.026)
Intercept 3.077∗∗ 2.817∗∗
(0.033) (0.018)
N 1530 1530
R2 0.714 0.638
F 39.208 16.884
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% . Fixed effects for countries included.
5 Short-term change in Institutions and Growth
Although the data arising from the three waves of the IPD database are somewhat
limited when performing thorough assessments, it has been possible to detect
some basic patterns that cannot be projected outside the range of time and space
considered. After this first approximation to testing the hypotheses of institutional
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improvement and convergence, it is the aim of this section to explore the short-
term associations between economic growth and institutional change given the
data that is available. We aim to estimate:
4Yi,t = α + β1Yi,t−1 + β24X ′i,t + β3D2006 + β4D2009 + ui,t (2)
Where 4Yi,t is the difference in the ln of GDP per capita in country i at time t
(t = 2001, 2006, 2009)9; Yi,t−1 is the lag of the ln of GDP per capita; 4X ′i,t is a
vector containing the first differences of the 10 institutional dimensions, D2006 is a
dummy for the year 2006; D2009 is a dummy for the year 2009; and ui,t is the error
term. In this estimation, delta (4) indicates changes over the period spanned by
the two IPD waves (either 5 or 3 years) instead of the more usual year-by-year
difference operator.
Table 4 presents the results. The model in column I shows the coefficients and
standard errors including all 10 institutional variables. None of the time dummies
are significant in this case. Of all ten institutional dimensions, only property rights
and rule of law, and security and order appear significant at the 1% level. The lag
of GDP level results significant at the 10% level. The model in column II presents
the last step of a pairwise regression, where irrelevant terms are progressively re-
moved. The variables retained are also the lag of GDP per capita at the 10% level,
and security and order and property rights at the 1% level. Only the coefficient
for property rights changes substantially when irrelevant terms are removed, sug-
gesting that collinearity among the institutions is not a big problem.10 The R2
decreases marginally from 0.64 to 0.62.11
9GDP measures are taken in constant prices, from Penn World Tables (chain series).
10A test of joint significance for the irrelevant terms gives an F statistic of 1.02 and a p-value
of 0.42, meaning that the terms are jointly not significantly different from zero.
11In order to better visualize the relationships between variables and the coefficients, refer to
the scatter matrices in Annex 7.3.
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Table 4: Stepwise regression: institutions on growth
Dependent variable: 4 Log of GDP per capita
I II
Lag of ln GDPcap -0.105† -0.119†
(0.058) (0.064)
Democracy and Civil Liberties (4t) -0.086
(0.158)
Security and Order (4t) 0.334∗∗ 0.311∗∗
(0.102) (0.095)
Dispersion of power (4t) 0.278
(0.218)
Social Cohesion and Dialogue (4t) 0.015
(0.173)
Property Rights and Rule of Law (4t) 0.463∗∗ 0.716∗∗
(0.171) (0.087)
Government Capacities (4t) 0.092
(0.139)
Transparency (4t) -0.021
(0.211)
Economic openness (4t) 0.334
(0.223)
Social openness (4t) -0.100
(0.200)
Intervention in the Economy (4t) -0.212
(0.148)
Year 2006 -0.161
(0.135)
Year 2009 -0.191
(0.136)
Intercept 0.861 1.062†
(0.550) (0.607)
N 152 152
R2 0.642 0.619
F 15.192 44.984
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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6 Conclusions
The Institutional Profiles Database is a source of institutional and policy data
designed and produced by the Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (AFD), and
has been carried out in 2001, 2006 and 2009. As the survey structure has been
expanded and enhanced after the 2006 wave, the three databases cannot be com-
bined for time series analysis in a straightforward way. However, after individually
selecting the 4-digit items (survey questions) that are comparable across waves, a
panel database for 51 countries and 159 variables could be assembled.
In order to synthesize the information for analysis, and to make the data interact
with the literature on institutions, a total of ten institutional dimensions and seven
policy variables were constructed out of the 159 items. A descriptive analysis of
the short-term evolution of these variables shows that countries tend to cluster by
region of the world, and that the behavior of institutions varies according to the
nature of the institution itself. In general terms, the 10 institutions assessed show
a more predictable and slow-moving behavior than the 7 policy variables.
Two hypotheses were put to test: a) that institutions converge over time; and
b) that the level of institutional maturity increases overtime, independently of
the country fixed effects. The two hypotheses find preliminary empirical support,
although the difference holds only for the comparison between 2001 and 2006/2009,
and not between 2006 and 2009. One interpretation possible is that the 2008 global
financial crisis made the perception of institution retract. Another possibility is
simply that the evolution of the institutions analyzed needs further evidence to
distinguish between contextual shocks and longer term trends. This suggests that
the results should be cautiously interpreted and further evidence is needed from
the forthcoming waves of the survey.
Another interesting (yet preliminary) finding is that once the data is differenced
(i. e. once we use deltas instead of levels), it is possible to observe associations
between some institutional dimensions and the growth of GDP per capita. The
findings are consistent with the strand of literature suggesting that security and
order, and the maintenance of property rights appear to be important conditions
for growth.
Regardless of the many angles that future research can take after better profiting
from the panel dimension of the IPD database, it is important to stress that the
time-dimension proves useful in providing new insightful ideas and reassessing the
evidence coming from purely cross sectional analyses.
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7 Annex
7.1 Countries included in the IPD panel database
Asia and Pacific China; Hong Kong; Indonesia; India;
Japan; Korea, South; Malaysia; Pak-
istan; Philippines; Singapore; Taiwan;
Thailand; Vietnam.
Western Europe and the USA Germany; France; Greece; Ireland;
Norway; Portugal; United States.
Central and Eastern Europe Bulgaria; Czech Republic; Hungary;
Lithuania; Poland; Romania; Russia;
Turkey; Ukraine.
Latin America and Caribbean Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Colombia;
Mexico; Peru; Venezuela.
Middle East and North Africa Algeria; Egypt; Iran; Israel; Morocco;
Saudi Arabia; Syria; Tunisia.
Sub-Saharan Africa Cote d’Ivoire; Cameroon; Ghana; Nige-
ria; Uganda; South Africa; Zimbabwe.
7.2 Conceptual Aggregation of IPD panel
I - Institutions
1 - Democracy and Civil Liberties
a- Democracy
a1000: Freedom and legality of elections
a1004: Participation of armed forces in political life, de jure or de facto
b- Civil liberties
a1030: Freedom of the press
a1031: Freedom of association
a1032: Freedom of assembly and demonstration
a1033: Respect for law in relations between citizens and the administration
a3052: De facto equality of treatment of foreigners (compared to nationals)
a8000: Freedom of movement of nationals (exit)
a8001: Freedom of movement of foreigners (entry)
a8002: Freedom of access to the foreign press (no seizures, etc.)
a8003: Freedom of television access (cable, satellite, etc.)
a8004: Freedom of Internet access
d1000: Right to strike in the private sector
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d1001: Right to strike in the public sector and the civil service
d1002: Freedom of collective bargaining in firms
d1003: Freedom of trade union operation in firms
d1010: Right to organise trade unions
2 - Security and Order
a2000: Security of persons and goods
a2001: Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature
a2002: Violent actions by underground political organisations
a2003: Organised criminal activity (drug-trafficking, arms-trafficking, etc.
a2030: Military tensions with other countries (excluding military intervention under in-
ternational mandate)
a8000: Freedom of movement of nationals (exit)
a8001: Freedom of movement of foreigners (entry)
3 - Dispersion of Power Institutions
a- Decentralization
a1070: Are the municipal authorities elected or appointed by central government?
a1071: Are the other local authorities (States in the case of federations, Regions,
Provinces, etc) elected or appointed by central government?
a1080: Extent of municipal authorities’ autonomy in fiscal matters
a1081: Extent of other local authorities’ autonomy in fiscal matters
b- Justice independence
a3050: Independence of the justice system from Government
a3053: Extent of enforcement and speed of rulings
a6020: Independence of the courts from the government in commercial disputes
a6021: Independence of the courts from litigants (local players) in commercial disputes.
a6023: Extent of enforcement and speed of rulings in commercial matters
c- Central Bank Independence
c4025: Independence of the Central Bank
4 - Social cohesion and social dialogue
a- Social cohesion
a1034: Respect for minorities (ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc)
a2001: Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature
a9030: Gender-based segregation
a9031: Ethnic or caste-based segregation
a9032: Religious segregation
d9010: Segmentation of the labour market by origin (ethnic, religious, caste, etc)
d9050: Do young graduates experience a higher unemployment rate than the average
unemployment rate?
b- Social dialogue
d7000: Main wage bargaining level
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d7010: Strikes in the public sector
d7011: Strikes in the private sector
d7030: Functioning of labour-management dialogue within firms
d7031: Functioning of labour-management dialogue at national level
5 - Property Rights and Rule of Law
a1033: Respect for law in relations between citizens and the administration
a3050: Independence of the justice system from Government
a3053: Extent of enforcement and speed of rulings
a6000: Effectiveness of legal measures to defend property rights between private agents
a6001: Compensation in the event of de jure or de facto expropriation of land property
(by the government or the local authorities)?
a6002: Compensation in the event of de jure or de facto expropriation of property for
production (by the government or the local authorities)?
a6003: Generally speaking, does the government exert arbitrary pressure on private prop-
erty (red tape, etc)?
a6010: Respect for written contracts (without mediation)
a6011: Respect for contracts with private mediation (lawyers, etc.)
a6012: Respect for contracts between local private players and foreigners
a6020: Independence of the courts from the government in commercial disputes
a6021: Independence of the courts from litigants (local players) in commercial disputes.
a6022: Equality of treatment between nationals and foreigners as regards commercial
disputes
a6023: Extent of enforcement and speed of rulings in commercial matters
a6030: Bankruptcy law
6 - Government Capacities
a2000: Security of persons and goods
a3125: Consistency and continuity of government action in non-political matters
a3113: Government’s authority over the administration
a5020: Is government action guided by a long-term strategic vision?
a5030: In particular, does the government have a strategy for the development of human
capital (training, health, etc.)?
a5031: In particular, does the government have an environmental protection strategy?
a5032: In particular, does the government have an international or regional integration
strategy?
c7030: Banking supervisory authority
c7031: Financial markets supervisory authority
c7032: Insurance market supervisory body
c7051: Tighter prudentional rules for the financial system
d6010: Labour inspectorate
7 - Transparency and accountability
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a3000: Transparency of Government budget
a3001: Transparency of Extra-budgetary funds
a3002: Transparency of Accounts of state-owned enterprises
a3003: Transparency of Accounts of public banks
a3004: Transparency of basic economic and financial statistics (national accounts, price
indices, foreign trade, currency and credit, etc)
a3005: Is the IMF consultation under Article IV published?
a3010: Is economic policy the subject of an official communication
a3011: Is economic policy the subject of public debate
a3020: Level of ”petty” corruption (between citizens and administrations)
a3021: Level of ”large scale” corruption (between administrations and local firms)
b4020 : Transparency of privatisation procedures
b6000: Standard accounting system (SMEs)
b6001 : Standard accounting system (large firms)
b6002: Certification of company accounts (SMEs)
b6003 : Certification of company accounts (large firms)
b6004: Intervention of international auditing firms
b6012 : International norms and standards (ISO, Codex, etc)
b7040: Level of information on the structure of shareholdings in local firms
c6000: Standard accounting system
c6001: Certification of banks’ accounts
c6020: Is there a publication requirement for issuing firms?
c7030: Banking supervisory authority
c7031: Financial markets supervisory authority
c7032: Insurance market supervisory body
c7040: Internal monitoring and autditing arrangements for private banks
c7041: Internal monitoring and autditing arrangements for public banks
c7052: Closer supervision of the financial system
d6010: Labour inspectorate
8 - Economic Openness
a1041: Degree of concentration of private media
a6060: Generally speaking, are unprofitable firms put into liquidation or kept in business?
b4040: Proportion of administered prices
b4041: Direct commodity price subsidies
b4042: Oil: deviation between local and market prices and world prices
b4020: Transparency of privatisation procedures
b4021 : Sale price close to market price
b4022: Have the privatisations benefited mainly the former company directors or rather
new local or foreigner players?
b6031 : International arrangements: TRIPS agreement
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b7000 : Administrative barriers in practice (red tape, etc.)
b7001: De facto barriers due to established competing firms’ practices
b7020 : Existence of arrangements to combat restrictive collective agreements (cartels,
etc.)
b8000: Convertibility for current transactions
b8001: WTO membership
b8002 : Issue of import licences
c4020: Administrative setting of interest rates
c4021: Quantitative credit controls
c4022: Compartmentalisation of banking system by law (loans to agriculture, industry,
hotel sector, etc)
c4023: Managed lending (by sector, to public enterprises, etc.)
c7000: Generally speaking, is the banking system mainly made up of cartels or mainly
competititve?
c7020: Difference between local and international capital adequacy standards (Cooke
ratio, etc)
c7021: Difference between local and international standards in terms of rules limiting
sector concentration of loans
c7022: Difference between local and international standards in terms of rules limiting
sector concentration of loans to particular borrowers
c7023: Difference between local and international standards in terms of rules limiting
banks’ external exposure
c7050: Increase in the level of competition in the financial system
c8000: Openness of bank capital to foreign shareholdings
c8001: Right of establishment for foreign banks (deposit banks and investment banks)
c8002: Access of foreign-owned or partly-foreign-owned firms to loans from local banks
c8003: Access of local banking firms to international bank loans
c8004: Access of local firms to international financial markets
d8000: Positioning of foreign executives in local firms
d8001: Positioning of foreign executives in foreign firms
9 - Social Openness
a5080: Society’s responsiveness to technological change and innovation
a5081: Society’s responsiveness to managerial change and innovation
a5082: Society’s responsiveness to legal and institutional change and innovation
a6022: Equality of treatment between nationals and foreigners as regards commercial
disputes
a8001: Freedom of movement of foreigners (entry)
a8002: Freedom of access to the foreign press (no seizures, etc.)
a8003: Freedom of television access (cable, satellite, etc.)
a8004: Freedom of Internet access
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a9030: Gender-based segregation
a9031: Ethnic or caste-based segregation
a9032: Religious segregation
a9040: Access to public education
a9043: Access to public sector employment
a9060: Healthcare coverage
d9030: Role of family, clan and social networks in recruitment and promotion in the
administration
d9031: Role of family, clan and social networks in recruitment and promotion in private
firms
10 - State Intervention in the Economy
a1040: Does the State control the content of the information in the different media, de
jure or de facto?
a9080f: Direct commodity price subsidies
b4040: Proportion of administered prices
b4041: Direct commodity price subsidies
b4042: Oil: deviation between local and market prices and world prices
b4050 : Single exchange rate for commercial transactions
b4021: Sale price close to market price
b7000: Administrative barriers in practice (red tape, etc.)
c4021: Quantitative credit controls
c4022: Compartmentalisation of banking system by law (loans to agriculture, industry,
hotel sector, etc)
c4023: Managed lending (by sector, to public enterprises, etc.)
II - Policies
11 - Social Policy
a9040: Access to public education
a9060: Healthcare coverage
a9061: Unemployment coverage
a9062: Retirement coverage
12 - Subsidies and Price Controls
a9080f: Direct commodity price subsidies (dropped)
b4040: Proportion of administered prices
b4041: Direct commodity price subsidies
b4042 : Oil: deviation between local and market prices and world prices
13 - Intellectual property protection
b6021: Intellectual property protection in terms of counterfeiting
b6030: Local arrangements for protection of intellectual property
b6031: International arrangements: TRIPS agreement
14 - Defence of competition
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b7000: Administrative barriers in practice (red tape, etc.)
b7001: De facto barriers due to established competing firms’ practices
b7020: Existence of arrangements to combat restrictive collective agreements (cartels,
etc.)
15 - Financial and Banking Policy
b4050: Single exchange rate for commercial transactions
c4020: Administrative setting of interest rates
c4021: Quantitative credit controls
c4022: Compartmentalisation of banking system by law (loans to agriculture, industry,
hotel sector, etc)
c4024: Lending directed towards Treasury financing
c5010: Government venture capital incentives
c6010: Mortgage guarantee system
c6011: Other system of guarantees required by the banks
c6020: Is there a publication requirement for issuing firms?
c7020: Difference between local and international capital adequacy standards (Cooke
ratio, etc)
c7021: Difference between local and international standards in terms of rules limiting
sector concentration of loans
c7022: Difference between local and international standards in terms of rules limiting
sector concentration of loans to particular borrowers
c7023: Difference between local and international standards in terms of rules limiting
banks’ external exposure
c7051: Tighter prudentional rules for the financial system
c8000: Openness of bank capital to foreign shareholdings
c8001: Right of establishment for foreign banks (deposit banks and investment banks)
c8002: Access of foreign-owned or partly-foreign-owned firms to loans from local banks
c8003: Access of local banking firms to international bank loans
c8004: Access of local firms to international financial markets
c9000: Informal micro-lending
c9001: Institutional micro-lending (supported by NGOs, banks, etc.)
16 - Labor Policy
d4000: Guaranteed employment for graduates in the public sector
d4001: Practice of guaranteed employment in the private sector ( ”lifelong employment”
type)
d4002: De facto or de jure wage indexation to inflation
d6001: Minimum wage
d6002: Dismissal procedures
d6020: Protection against individual dismissal
d6021: Protection against mass redundancies
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d6022: Open-ended contracts as share of total employment contracts
d6010: Labour inspectorate
d7000: Main wage bargaining level
17 - Education and Training Policy
a9040: Access to public education
b5000: Proportion of technical staff (engineers, technicians) in SMEs/SMIs
b5001: Proportion of technical staff (engineers, technicians) in large firms
b5002: Cooperation links between businesses, universities and research centres
d5000: Adult vocational training
d5001: Vocational training matched to firms’ requirements?
d9051: Tendency of firms to recruit graduates
7.3 Scatter matrices: institutions and policies
Figure 12: Scatter matrix of institutions
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Figure 13: Scatter matrix of policies
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